After news broke that Zantac (the brand name for ranitidine) was linked to cancer, a large wave of lawsuits started making their way into state and federal courts. Many of these cases have been consolidated into the Zantac multi-district litigation, or MDL 2924.

The Zantac MDL is still in the early stages of litigation, but the court just handed down two major decisions that could dramatically undermine a majority of the cases and claims.

We’ll go over these two decisions, but before we do, we need to provide a little context. We’ll start with outlining the defendants and claims in the Zantac MDL, then discuss a legal concept called “preemption.”

The Defendants in the Zantac MDL

There are five main groups of defendants in the Zantac MDL:

• Brand-Name Manufacturers of Zantac
• Generic Manufacturers of Ranitidine
• Distributors of Ranitidine Products
• Retailers of Ranitidine Products
• Repackagers of Ranitidine Products

To learn more about each of these defendants, you can check out my blog post, Zantac Litigation Master Complaint Key Points, Part 1: The Parties Involved.

The Allegations in the Zantac MDL

The plaintiffs in the Zantac MDL set out their allegations in the following three master complaints:

• Master Personal Injury Complaint (MPIC)
• Consolidated Consumer Class Action Complaint (CCCAC)
• Consolidated Third Party Payor Class Complaint (CTPPCC)

There is a fair amount of overlap concerning the overall gist of the allegations in these complaints. Causes of action among the complaints include various strict products liability claims, as well as claims relating to negligence, breach of warranties, violations of consumer-protection laws, violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and derivative claims (like loss of consortium and wrongful death).

The MPIC and CCCAC include both the generic manufacturers and repackagers of ranitidine as defendants. The CTPPCC includes generic manufacturers of ranitidine as defendants, but not repackagers of ranitidine.

After these complaints were filed, the generic manufacturer and repackager defendants (collectively, Generic Defendants) filed a motion to dismiss and the retailer and distributor defendants (collectively, Retailer Defendants) filed two motions to dismiss.

On December 31, 2020, the Zantac MDL court granted the Generic and Retailer Defendants’ motions to dismiss based largely on preemption grounds. These rulings have the potential to undermine and even end a majority of the Zantac MDL plaintiffs’ claims. But what is preemption and why does it matter?

Preemption and Why It’s Kind of a Big Deal in the Zantac MDL

Preemption is the legal principle that says federal law is the supreme law of the land. In other words, when federal law conflicts with state law, federal law wins (or “controls”). Preemption sometimes comes into play when plaintiffs sue generic drug makers (and related parties, like repackagers) for injuries from their products.

Most medicines and drugs sold in the United States are subject to regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This includes rules about labeling, safety, effectiveness, when a drug can be sold as a generic and so on. But many personal injury claims involving pharmaceuticals arise from state law.

The FDA has established very specific rules about how generic drug manufacturers can sell a name-brand drug as a generic. After a name-brand drug is approved by the FDA (including how it’s labeled) generic drug companies who want to sell that name-brand drug are limited in what changes they can make to the drug. Without getting into the nitty-gritty, a generic drug company cannot substantially alter the drug or its label, including warnings placed on the packaging.

So let’s say a plaintiff uses state law to bring a personal injury lawsuit against a generic drug company claiming it didn’t properly warn patients of the risks when taking the drug. This puts the generic drug company in an unfair situation.

The generic drug company is being sued under state law for not changing the warning label of the drug. But federal law prohibits the generic drug company from making that label change. This is a conflict between state and federal law, so preemption comes into play and dismisses the failure to warn claims based on state law.

This means that the plaintiff’s legal case against the generic drug company is often effectively over because federal law overrides state law, leaving the plaintiff with few legal options to pursue a meaningful recovery.

This is largely what happened concerning the Generic and Retailer Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Now we can take a look at each motion more closely.

The Generic Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

In its motion to dismiss, the Generic Defendants made the majority of their arguments relying on the theory of preemption. These arguments applied, at least in part, to the following plaintiffs’ claims:

• The generic drugs had labeling and product defects.
• The Generic Defendants should have conducted more testing of their generic drugs.
• The Generic Defendants should have adjusted the expiration date of the generic drugs.
• Ranitidine should have been stored and transported differently.
• The Generic Defendants should have warned the FDA about ranitidine’s cancer risk.
• The generic drugs had a manufacturing defect.
• The Generic Defendants violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
• The Generic Defendants have absolute liability for the harm plaintiffs suffered from taking ranitidine.
• Generic Defendant’s liability has led to derivative claims, including wrongful death and loss of consortium.

In deciding the motion to dismiss, the court sided with the Generic Defendants on every single point, largely relying on preemption. But that’s not the worst part for the plaintiffs.

The worst part is that not only did the court agree to dismiss all the claims, but it agreed that many of them should be dismissed “with prejudice.” That means that those claims cannot be rewritten and refiled and are lost forever.

Often, courts will grant a motion to dismiss, but give plaintiffs an opportunity to revise and adjust their legal arguments. This is called dismissing the claims “without prejudice.”

In this scenario, a court is telling plaintiffs that their arguments will not succeed as currently presented, but the plaintiffs might be successful if they replead the same legal arguments differently in an amended complaint.

In this Zantac MDL, the court only granted this “do-over” opportunity with the following plaintiffs’ claims:

• Expiration dates
• Testing
• Storage and transportation methods
• Warning the FDA
• Manufacturing defects
• Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
• Derivative claims

Notice what’s missing: claims concerning product and labeling defects and absolute liability. These are among the strongest claims being made by the plaintiffs in the Zantac MDL.

The Retailer Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

There were two motions to dismiss that were decided by the court.

In the first motion to dismiss, Retailer Defendants’ arguments were very similar to the Generic Defendants. Basically, Retailer Defendants argued that preemption required the court to dismiss the bulk of plaintiffs’ claims, including:

• Absolute liability
• Misbranding of products containing ranitidine
• General negligence
• Violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
• Derivative claims, including wrongful death and loss of consortium

Just like with the Generic Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court largely relied on preemption to dismiss every single one of the plaintiffs’ counts against the Retailer Defendants.

The court also allowed the counts to be dismissed with prejudice, except the plaintiffs’ claims for general negligence (to the extent they do not include arguments relating to the adequacy of the ranitidine label or the design of ranitidine), derivative claims and violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaints to replead these claims.

Regarding the Retailer Defendants’ second motion to dismiss, the court denied it as moot, as it was based on arguments made in the first motion to dismiss.

Now What Happens in the Zantac MDL?

The court will soon release its decision concerning the Zantac brand-name manufacturers’ motion to dismiss. This is another very important court ruling that could have major implications on the Zantac MDL moving forward.

Plaintiffs will then have 30 days after the court releases that pending decision to file their amended complaints concerning the Generic and Retailer Defendants.

But the Zantac brand-name manufacturers’ motion to dismiss also relies heavily on preemption arguments. We still believe many viable and important claims will survive against the makers of Zantac, but recent court decisions have not been kind to certain plaintiffs in the Zantac litigation.

If you believe you have been harmed by Zantac, call me: (919) 830-5602.

Smith & Nephew Artificial Hip Replacement

By way of background, the hip is a ball-and-socket joint, moving not just forward and back (like a knee joint) but also sideways. In a total hip replacement, part of the upper thigh bone and the ball portion of the hip joint are replaced with metal components. Part of the replacement includes a liner between the ball and the socket that allows the hip to rotate freely. Some patients have hip resurfacing surgery instead, where only the interface between the hip joint’s ball and its socket is replaced with a new surface.

The plaintiff in this case, Walter Shuker, received a total hip replacement using Smith & Nephew’s R3 Acetabular System. Although Smith & Nephew holds itself out as a “world leader in joint replacement systems,” the R3 hip replacement that Shuker received didn’t use a typical plastic liner.

Instead, the liner in Shuker’s replaced hip was an R3 metal liner designed for use in Smith & Nephew’s Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System. The R3 metal liner was neither designed nor approved for total hip replacement. In fact, its label states that it “must be replaced with an R3 poly[ethylene] liner” if used in a total hip replacement. Despite that label, Smith & Nephew marketed the R3 metal liner as an “option for its R3 Acetabular System” in its promotional materials.

Less than two years after having his hip replaced, Shuker developed hip pain that was severe enough to limit his activities. When his surgeon investigated, he found “metallic debris” indicating that the metal-on-metal joint in his hip was wearing away and had to be replaced. Shuker ended up needing multiple revision surgeries to correct the defective replaced hip.

Walter Shuker’s Case Against Smith & Nephew

Shuker brought three types of state law claims against Smith & Nephew: for its failure to warn patients about the dangers of the R3 metal liner, he claimed negligence, strict liability, and breach of implied warranty. Based on Smith & Nephew’s off-label promotion of the R3 metal liner, Shuker also claimed negligence, while his wife claimed loss of consortium. Finally, Shuker argued that Smith & Nephew engaged in fraud.

The trial court dismissed Shuker’s claims, finding that they were preempted by federal law.

Shuker appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which recently issued its opinion. The appeals court agreed that the failure to warn claims should be dismissed due to federal preemption. However, it allowed Shuker’s off-label promotion claims to proceed.

So what does federal preemption actually mean, and how did it apply here?

Federal Preemption and Medical Device Lawsuits

The U.S. Constitution declares federal law to be the “supreme law of the land.” Therefore, when a state law conflicts with a federal law, the federal law controls and the state law is essentially voided. This concept is called preemption. Preemption may be express—where a federal law specifically says that it controls and that state laws can’t interfere—or it may be implied.

Medical devices are regulated under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. That law expressly states that it preempts any state “safety or effectiveness” claims. Here, Shuker tried to claim that Smith & Nephew was negligent under state law even though it had passed the Food and Drug Administration’s safety regulations for medical devices. The Third Circuit held that Shuker’s state law negligence claim was preempted by federal law.

Why did Shuker attempt this argument? His lawyer argued that only the component that failed—the R3 metal liner—was regulated and governed by federal law. The system as a whole, the argument went, was not subject to the same strict federal regulation. It’s true that only the R3 metal liner was subject to a comprehensive testing and approval process. However, the appeals court held that a medical device is defined as any component within the device, not the entire system as a whole, preempting these claims.

Federal preemption is one of several powerful defenses available to negligent medical device manufacturers. Often people injured by the clear negligence of companies do not have a right to compensation because of the legal concept of preemption. (This is one reason it is critically important for federal agencies like the FDA to “get it right” when allowing products into the market.)

Fortunately for the Shukers, the appeals court also ruled that their off-label promotion claims—arguing that Smith & Nephew negligently marketed the R3 metal liner for an unsafe off-label use—were not expressly preempted by federal law. Those claims are still pending in the trial court.

What Does This Mean for Your Case?

As you’ve probably figured out, these cases can be complicated! Federal preemption often lurks to destroy what may seem to be a valid claim against a negligent manufacturer. If you’re having a problem with a medical device, you don’t have to try to fight the manufacturer alone. Give me a call today to discuss your specific injuries and your specific claims against the manufacturer (919.830.5602).